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I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past several years a change in the environment for invest-
ment in Hungary has taken place in which regulations concerning for-
eign investment and the capacity to engage in foreign trade have been
substantially modified.' These changes have followed Hungary's modest
success in stabilizing financial accounts during the late 1970's and the
first half of the 1980's.1 The changes have also followed as resources
I. See Telegram from the American Embassy in Budapest, Hungary to the Secre-
tary of State, Washington, D.C. 053177 (Jan. 1987) (discussing joint ventures in Hun-
gary) [hereinafter Review of Joint Ventures in Hungary]; U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COM-
MERCE, INTERNATIONAL TRADE ADMINISTRATION. FOREIGN ECONOMIC TRENDS IN
HUNGARY 7-8 (1987) [hereinafter FOREIGN ECONOMIC TRENDS]. See also Madl, Prin-
ciple Elements of the New Regulation of Foreign Trade in Hungary, in 3 QUESTIONS
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: HUNGARIAN PERSPECTIVES 133 (H. Boker-Szejo, ed. 1986).
Concerning development of reform measures in Hungary over a longer period of time,
see HUNGARIAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, HOW TO TRADE WITH HUNGARY (1983)
[hereinafter How TO TRADE WITH HUNGARY]; THE WORLD BANK (A COUNTRY
STUDY), HUNGARY: ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS AND REFORMS 30-66 (1984) [hereinaf-
ter HUNGARY: ECONOMIC DEVILOPMENTS AND REFORMS]; P. MARER, EAST WEST RE-
LATIONS AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER: A STUDY OF HUNGARY, 1968-1984, AT 55
(1986). Concerning the nature of Hungarian Enterprises, see Naray, Hungarian For-
eign Trade Reform, 20 JOURNAL OF WORLD TRADE LAW 275 (1986); Bassanyi, The
Newly Independent Enterprises in Hungary, 32 ACTA OECONOMICA 266 (1984).
2. FOREIGN ECONOMIC TRENDS, supra note 1. See also Comisso & Marer, The
Economics and Politics of Reform in Hungary, 40 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION
(277)
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for investment have become more scarce in Hungary.
In the early 1980's Hungary, which is a member of the Council of
Mutual Economic Assistance ("CMEA"), the economic association of
Eastern European trading partners of the Soviet Union, expanded trade
with CMEA partners while trade with Western nations declined.3 Hun-
gary responded to these changes by liberalizing joint venture laws in
1986. The Hungarian banking system was restructured in 1987, partly
to support joint ventures. Included in the banking reform was the de-
velopment of commercial banking and the extension of onshore banking
privileges to Western institutions.
A new international posture is highlighted by membership in the
World Bank and affiliated institutions.5 New bankruptcy laws have
been developed, and the government has committed itself to a broader
application of such laws. 6 In 1988 a new program of economic austerity
focusing on price increases is to take effect.7 A progressive income tax
is also to be introduced.8 Moreover, the Hungarian leadership is consid-
ering further economic reform measures and, even more conspicuously,
political reform.9
430 (1986); Antal, Zur Lage der Ungarischen Wirtschaft in Fruhjahr 1984, 33
SUDOST-EUROPA 279 (1985). Hungary's success in stabilizing financial accounts was
assisted by a stabilization program developed under the auspices of the International
Monetary Fund. See infra note 75 and accompanying text.
3. See FOREIGN ECONOMIC TRENDS, supra note 1, at 5-7; East-West Financial
Relations: Developments in 1985 and Future Prospects, FINANCIAL INVESTMENT
TIMES, Mar. 1986, at 21 [hereinafter East-West Financial Relations]. See also Antal,
supra note 2, at 271-276.
4. Citibank established such a venture in late 1985. See Review of Joint Ventures
in Hungary, supra note 1. "Hungary's upcoming bank decentralization may lead to
serious confusion, at least initially for Western companies. Outstanding policy issues as
well as logistical shortcomings mean that it will take some time for [Foreign Trade
Organizations] and the new 'commercial' banks to sort themselves out." Bank Decen-
tralization: Confusion in Hungary, Business Eastern Europe, Nov. 24, 1986, at 371.
5. Hungary acceded to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT")
in 1973. Concerning the reconstruction and reform of foreign trade practices in Hun-
gary, see Madi, supra note 1, at 134.
6. See Hungary, a Lesson in Reform, THE ECONOMIST, July 11-17, 1987, at 67;
See also FOREIGN ECONOMIC TRENDS, supra note 1, at 5; Kamm, In Hungary, the
Spirit of Change Reappears, N.Y. Times, Aug. 10, 1987, at AI0 col. I [hereinafter In
Hungary].
7. See Kamm, Budapest Leaders, infra note 9, at A1l, col. I. The general process
of restructuring of pricing mechanisms with specific reference to foreign trade is dis-
cussed in Madl, supra note 1, at 141.
8. Id.
9. The discussion of political reform concerns, among other approaches, giving
more independent authority to parliament; Hungary has been distinguishable among
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Hungarian economic reform can be traced back to 1968 with the
creation of the New Economic Mechanism ("NEM") which extended
personal economic rights and began a process of structural reform."0
Similar measures, which sought to implement elements of market eco-
nomics and provide greater autonomy to enterprise decisions, are now
reflected in the economic programs of many Soviet-bloc countries." In-
deed, Soviet foreign relations increasingly focuses on the need for eco-
nomic reform in these countries, and Secretary-General Gorbachev has
indicated a Soviet willingness to tolerate greater economic diversity in
Eastern Europe. 2
Despite the changes in Hungary, many believe that the stagnation
that has developed in Hungary's economy since the late seventies nev-
ertheless will persist without more thorough reform.13 In the midst of
this anxiety over the severity of the economic crisis, intellectual fer-.
such systems insofar as its elections are conducted with multiple lists, a practice also
developing in other countries; See Kamm, Budapest Leaders Look for Support: Seek
to Enlist Intellectuals to Back a New Program of Economic Austerity, N.Y. Times,
Oct. 25, 1987, at Al l col. I [hereinafter Budapest Leaders]. Concerning options for
economic reform, see Tardos, A Development Program for Economic Control and Or-
ganization in Hungary, EASTERN EUROPEAN ECONOMICS, Spring/Summer 1984, at 67-
87; see the discussion of the views of R. Nyers, described as a "founding father of
Hungary's drive for economic changes," in Kamm, supra note 6.
10. See THE ECONOMIST, supra note 6, at 48; HUNGARY: ECONOMIC DEVELOP-
MENTS AND REFORMS, supra note 1, at 30-66; see also Thompa, Le point sur privitisa-
tion de l'economie Hongroise, 281 LE COURIER DES PAYS DE L'EST 24 (1984).
11. It is apparent, however, that reform will not be forced upon Eastern European
countries. See Kraus, Soviet Policy Toward East Europe, 86 CURRENT HISTORY 353
(1987); Taubman, Soviets Won't Push Policy on Allies, Gorbachev Says, N.Y. Times,
Nov. 5, 1987, at Al, col. I (report of a speech by Gorbachev to foreign delegates
attending the commemoration of the 70th anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution).
Concerning Soviet interest in reviving joint ventures, see Buxbaum, Legal Issues Con-
cerning the Financial Aspects of Joint Ventures with Non-Market Economy Firms, 2
INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES 66, 67 (1987).
Concerning Soviet economic reform, see Taubman, Gorbachev Urges Radical Changes
to Spur Economy, N.Y. Times, June 26, 1987, at Al col. 5; Keller, Gorbachev Urges
Expansion of Family Farms, N.Y. Times, July 1, 1987, at A 1l, col. 1; Tucker, Where
is the Soviet Union Headed?, 4 WORLD POLICY JOURNAL 179 (1987). An excellent
discussion of the international politics of economic reform in Eastern Europe is Ruhfus,
Die Politische Dimension der Wirtschaftsbeziehungen zwischen Ost und West, 42 Eu-
ROPA-ARCHIV 1 (1987). See also, Steel Plant Attempts "Self-Financing," The Wash-
ington Post, Aug. 17, 1987, at A17 col. 2 (concerning the Magnitogorsk steel factory in
the USSR).
12. Taubman, supra note 11.
13. See Kamm, Budapest Leaders, supra note 9; Kamm, In Hungary, supra note
6; Bognar, Further Developments in Economic Reform, 25 NEw HUNGARIAN QUAR-
TERLY 53-54 (1984).
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ment is occurring over strategies for modernization among Hungarian
economists, and there is little shortage of plans for further market-ori-
ented reform.1' Current Hungarian policy is to develop new forms of
economic organization and management expertise with the joint ven-
ture expected to play an important role. 6
The two critical factors affecting Hungarian economic policy are
(1) the relative stagnation of the domestic economy and (2) the reality
of trade dependence under conditions where broader integration into
the international economy has been an elusive goal.' 6 Fifty-five percent
of the gross national product is derived from foreign trade. 7 The re-
sulting foreign debt, much of which has been restructured, encourages
policies designed to maintain a constant supply of hard currency sur-
plus."6 As the terms of trade in a difficult international economic envi-
ronment have worsened, and as the Soviet Union has demanded higher
quality goods and demanded participation in joint intra-CMEA
projects that has further drained Hungarian resources, domestic eco-
nomic policy has placed a priority on implementing austerity
measures.19
During the past two decades Western opportunities for investment
in Eastern European countries generally have greatly expanded. Coun-
tries in the region have concluded numerous treaties concerning trade,
taxation and investment with Western industrial nations.20 As evident
in these treaties and other agreements, the development of a legal
framework to accommodate and reconcile differing conceptions of en-
terprise management and economic practices has been essential to the
expansion of trade and investment.2
Nevertheless, reforms that have encouraged foreign investment
14. Bognar, supra note 13.
15. See Review of Joint Ventures in Hungary, supra note 1; HUNGARIAN CHAM-
BER OF COMMERCE, JOINT VENTURES IN HUNGARY, 8-9 (1986).
16. See Volgyes, Hungary: Before the Storm Breaks, 86 CURRENT HISTORY 374
(1987).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. See FOREIGN ECONOMIC TRENDS, supra note 1, at 8; Kamm, In Hungary,
supra note 6; Volgyes, supra note 16.
20. Concerning tax treaties, see Doman, East-West Trade Treaties, 10 INT'L BUS.
L. 193 (1982). Concerning investment agreements, see Burckhardt, Promotion of East-
West Joint Ventures by Governments of Western Countries, 10 INT'L Bus. L. 112
(1982).
21. See T. Hoya, EAST-WEST TRADE, COMECON LAW, AMERICAN-SOVIET TRADE,
16-17 (1984); Schmidt, Legal Aspects of Doing Business in Hungary 15 VAND. J.
TRANS. L. 253, 268-73 (1982).
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have been criticized for lacking in implementation what they appear to
strive for on paper.22 These criticisms have been addressed in Hungary
by designating the Hungarian Chamber of Commerce and other agen-
cies as primary agents for overcoming impediments to the formation
and development of joint ventures and for coordinating government ac-
tion. The role of the Chamber of Commerce, in particular, is now quite
prominent in this area.23 Furthermore, while other East European
countries have pursued strategies of economic reform and evolved poli-
cies designed to improve specific types of ties to Western nations, the
Hungarian economic system has begun to resemble the economic struc-
ture of a Western European nation. Specifically, management has be-
come less bureaucratized and significantly more decentralized, an effect
that is changing the character of relations among enterprises and be-
tween enterprises and the state.24
Still, the Western investor will find that a division of responsibility
persists among enterprises and state institutions that has debilitating
effects. For example, because of exogenous structural constraints, joint-
venture exports to other CMEA countries remain troublesome since
much of the reform taken to date constitutes a diversification of roles
- "a rearrangement of competencies" - rather than abandonment of
state roles. 5 In the area of banking, the 1987 reforms created organi-
zations with considerable autonomy, but the results may be inhibited
by the structure of trade relations.2 6
Hungarian enterprise now is characterized by a three tier struc-
22. See THE ECONOMIST, supra note 6, at 47-48. See also Scriven, Cooperation in
East-West Trade: The Equity Joint Venture, 10 INT'L. Bus. L. 110 (1982). In some
East European countries (e.g. Bulgaria) reform measures, are essentially "paper laws,"
being minimal in the degree of development. (Yugoslavia was the first eastern Euro-
pean country to actively develop a joint venture program in the late 1960's). See
Scriven, Joint Venture Legislation in Eastern Europe: A Practical Guide, 21 HARV. L.
J. 633 (1982).
23. See Review of Joint Ventures in Hungary, supra note 1. See also, Hungary
Sets up Club to Air Joint Venture Complaints, BUSINESS EASTERN EUROPE, Nov. 10,
1986, at 355. For a discussion of government agency involvement see Sajo & Csillag,
Law-Making as Administrative Behavior: the Case of Investment Regulation in Hun-
gary, 15 INT'L. J. SOCIOLOGY L. 209 (1987).
24. Regarding decentralized management, see Sajo & Csillag, supra note 23. See
also Naray, supra note I, at 274, 277; cf Havasi, Further Development of a System of
Economic Control and Management in Hungary, 32 ACTA OECONOMICA 199 (1984);
Bossanyi, supra note 1, at 269 (discussing the break-up of nation-wide holding compa-
nies); Kamm, In Hungary, supra note 6.
25. See Madl, supra note I, at 134-38.
26. Concerning banking reform, see Review of Joint Ventures in Hungary, supra
note 1; Bank Decentralization: Confusion in Hungary, supra note 4, at 371.
19881
282 MD. JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW & TRADE [Vol. 12
ture which includes two new forms: (1) traditional state enterprises; (2)
enterprise council-directed associations; and (3) self governing enter-
prises. 17 Self-governing enterprises are under the direction of a meeting
of delegates, or an employee's general meeting, and enterprise activities
are discretionary, i.e., under the control of the enterprise rather than
the state. 8 More and more enterprises are being reorganized into this
third category.2
The development of formal relationships with the International
Monetary Fund and the World Bank, i.e., the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development has established a basis for increased
international integration and has furthered the process of reorganiza-
tion of the Hungarian economy. 0 Privately held hard currency Hun-
garian debt was substantial at the time of Hungary's application for
membership in the World Bank in 1982. 3' This debt remains relatively
large, motivating, as is the case in other Eastern European countries,
policies designed to balance the flow of currencies and stabilize the
availability of convertible currencies."
27. See Naray, supra note 1, at 274-75.
28. The state's role has been reduced to that of founder. Id.
29. Id.
30. The impact of Western legal concepts on economic relations within Hungary
and other CMEA countries should not be overlooked. International law agreements and
joint venture contracts have been borrowed in Hungary particularly as municipal law.
See Schmidt, supra note 21, at 253, 268-273. See also Roman, Conflicts of Laws Solu-
tions in the Hungarian New Private International Law, 10 INT'L. J. LEGAL INFO. 169
(1979). Concerning legal process and the legal profession in Hungary, see Simon, The
Hungarian Legal System, with Special Regard to the Practice of Law, 9 INTERNA-
TIONAL Bus. L. 189 (1981).
31. Sajosi-Kovats, Hungary and the World Bank Group, 2 HUNGARIAN BUSINESS
HERALD 14 (1986)
32. Writes one author:
Hungary has been unsuccessful in integrating itself with the Western economy;
today its debt service ratio is one of the highest in the world and in 1987 it faces
the necessity of rescheduling, the resulting loss of future loans, and financial chaos.
Because of the unwise use of loans, the enormous changes in oil prices-both in
the East and in the West-and the complete stoppage of investments, however, the
expected technical and technological restructuring has not occurred. Today Hun-
gary is at the mercy of Western bankers demanding repayment, and it is also at
the mercy of both eastern and Western economies.
Volgyes, supra note 16, at 374. It should be noted that what must be put up with by
Hungarian financial officials is no less than what is experienced in other regions. Com-
pare Sajosi-Kovats, supra note 31. See also FOREIGN ECONOMIC TRENDS, supra note 1,
at 5-7.
Concerning the recent trade imbalance and its impact on reform considerations,
see Kamm, In Hungary, supra note 6, quoting R. Nyers: "The present circumstances
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II. UNITED STATES POLICY
Reform of the banking system, the development of onshore West-
ern financial institutions, and the liberalization of joint venture law
must be understood in terms of the overall financial setting and East-
West relations generally. Numerous considerations enter into an assess-
ment of the recent changes affecting the choice among options for the
United States. Some of the options are whether to pursue negotiations
of investment agreements, the choice of roles to play in multilateral
associations, whether to encourage U.S. corporations to do business in
the region, and whether to condition expanded trade with the Soviet
Union on the restructuring of intra-CMEA trade practices.3
The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank have pro-
vided leadership in addressing the financial difficulties of the region and
have helped these countries regain access to Western financial mar-
kets.34 In the context of this leadership, the United States economic
policy has centered on human rights and, to a lesser extent, U.S. export
opportunities. 35 The United States government also has given special
priority to augmenting vigilance and co-ordination in the area of tech-
remind us of the 1970's, external and internal imbalances, overregulated state machin-
ery, financial survival of lame duck companies and an aversion by efficient enterprises
to taking new risks." Hard currency surpluses exist between Hungary and other
CMEA countries. See FOREIGN ECONOMIC TRENDS, supra note 1, at 9.
33. The region has experienced varying degrees of economic hardship for many
years. In Rumania, six years of food shortages are leading to widespread malnutrition,
and U.S. trade preferences are in danger because of restrictions on emigration, particu-
larly of members of the Hungarian minority. See Lee, Romanian Austerity Grips Citi-
zens, The Washington Post, Aug. 17, 1987, at A15, col. 1. Poland's financial problems
are severe, resulting in a recent plan to hold a referendum on whether to raise prices
generally by as much as forty percent. See J. Tagliabue, Poland, Planning Many
Changes Calls Referendum on Economy, The N.Y. Times, Oct. 9, 1987, at AI, Col. 1.
In Hungary itself, the legality of moonlighting in independent enterprise, a routine
lifestyle for individuals and teams of workers has given rise to overwork, leading to
what Janos Kis, a Hungarian philosopher has called "the biological limits of self-ex-
ploitation." Kamm, Lean Times in Hungary, The Land of Good Living is Looking a
Bit Wan, N.Y. Times, August 5, 1987, at A3, col. 1 [hereinafter Lean Times in
Hungary].
34. Hungary had never lost access to Western markets. Note also that the United
States has a continued interest in maintaining and expanding agricultural and related
industrial product trade to Hungary. See FOREIGN ECONOMIC TRENDS, supra note 1,
at 9. But see Leurs, The U.S. and Eastern Europe, 65 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 980, 989
(1987).
35. DEPT. OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR
1986, AT 940-950 (1986) [hereinafter COUNTRY REPORTS]; FOREIGN ECONOMIC
TRENDS, supra note 1, at 9-11.
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nology transfer.-3
U.S. export opportunities were affected by the NATO coordinat-
ing committee ("Cocom") which produced a list of embargoed items
which directly affected U.S. trade practices.37 Unilateral trade action
on the part of the United States could be circumvented by other West-
ern countries. In response Congress passed the Export Administration
Act, legislation that circumscribed the authority of the President to or-
der trade restrictions. 8
A development that might impact on joint ventures and trade
would be an Hungarian arrangement utilizing a strategic resource
which, for some reason, became an immediate strategic issue; e.g., a
Soviet pipeline to the West over Hungarian soil. In an emergency, or
for critical national security reasons, the President of the United States
has authority to restrict movement of goods.39 The United States Em-
bassy in Hungary, however, currently views investment in Hungary as
involving minimal political risk.4
Similarly, there seem to be limited political risks associated with
Hungary's human rights policy. Over the past two decades Hungary's
human rights record has been among the more exemplary of the East-
ern European States. During years of difficult relations between Wash-
ington and Moscow, this factor, along with the more favorable climate
for international investment, allowed for warmer relations between
36. See DEPT. OF STATE, EAST-WEST RELATIONS AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER,
CURRENT POLICY No. 568, MAR. 29, 1984, AT 2-5 [hereinafter TECHNOLOGY TRANS-
FER]. For a discussion of the issues in detail, see Blair, Export Control on Western
Made Goods and Technology: Are We Penalizing the Soviets or Ourselves? 21 TEX.
INT'L. L. J. 363 (1986); Levine, Technology Transfer, Export Controls v. Free Trade,
21 TEX. INT'L. L. J. 373. See also Osakwe, Navigating the Unchartered Waters of
East-West Economic Relations: A Legal Compass, 21 TEX. INT'L. L. J. 211.
37. Three lists exist under the auspices of Cocom: (1) a munitions list; (2) an
atomic energy list, and (3) an international list covering so-called "dual use" items.
The latter area is clearly the most difficult one. Ability to effect enforcement against
companies violating Cocom rules, or independent U.S. restrictions is the determinant of
U.S. leverage, and significant efforts have been made in the area of enforcement of
existing or newly agreed-upon rules. TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, supra note 36.
38. 50 U.S.C. § 2401 (1982). A good exploration of the labyrinth of U.S. export
controls is Davis & Bialos, The Predictability Problem: Issues Under U.S. Export Pol-
icy, in PRIVATE INVESTORS ABROAD-PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL
BUSINESS IN 1986 (1986).
39. Once a good is classified as an export, differing types of licensing requirements
will be required: see 15 C.F.R. § 376.14. The Jackson/Vanik amendment to the Trade
Act of 1974 placed human rights conditions on Most Favored Nation treatment, in-
cluding Export/Import Bank credits; see COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 35.
40. See FOREIGN ECONOMIC TRENDS, supra note 1, at 9-11.
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Washington and Budapest than existed between Washington and other
Eastern European capitols. Certainly, a reversal of Hungary's human
rights conduct could impact upon joint ventures and trade relations
generally. In this regard it is also noteworthy that the Trade Act of
1974 requires the President of the United States to find that emigration
policies are sufficiently liberal to allow for continued favorable eco-
nomic treatment.41 Nevertheless, Hungary has maintained its favorable
economic treatment.42 Hungary, Romania, and recently Poland have
obtained Most Favored Nation Status in economic relations with the
United States, and human rights policies have been invoked to justify
such differentiation.4
Hungary currently enjoys very good relations with Washington.
The increasing personal economic freedom is being received warmly. In
its 1986 Report to Congress concerning human rights the State De-
partment stated:
Economic reform, launched in 1968, is still the key to Hungary's
relatively tolerant domestic policies. After years of belt-tightening,
the Government is trying to cope with growing popular unhappiness
about rising prices and a stationary, if not declining, standard of
living by allowing modest wage increases and moving ahead with
economic reforms. Hungarians as a whole are significantly freer of
the type of economic restrictions and state interference in private
life which characterize other Warsaw Pact members. 4
There are few formal economic ties between the United States and
Hungary. The treaties governing United States-Hungarian economic
relations were for the most part concluded during the late 1970's.
These agreements are: (1) the Agreement on Trade Relations which
entered into force on July 7, 1978; 41 (2) the Convention for the Avoid-
ance of Double Taxation which entered into force in September of
41. Export Administration Act, supra note 38.
42. See Presidential Message to Congress on Trade with Hungary, the People's
Republic of China, and Romania, 19 WEEKLY COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL Docu-
MENTS No. 22 (JUNE 6, 1983), AT 825-27.
43. See Marer, U.S. East-West Trade Policy, in East-West Economic Relations
in the Changing Global Environment, p. 10 (1986) (A review of report to the Congress
and the Trade Policy Committee on trade between the U.S. and the non-market econ-
omy countries, Wash., D.C.: U.S. International Trade Commission Quarterly).
44. See COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 35, at 940-41.
45. Agreement on Trade Relations, Mar. 17, 1978, United States - Hungary, 29
U.S.T. 2711, T.I.A.S. No. 8967.
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1979;'1 and (3) the Agreement on Tariff Matters within the Multilat-
eral Trade Negotiations at Geneva, which entered into force in Janu-
ary, 1980, with Related and Amending Agreements, entering into force
in May and September of 1980.47 No distinct investment agreement
has been concluded between Hungary and the United States.
The Agreement on Trade Relations recognizes in its preamble
"that the development of economic and commercial relations can con-
tribute to general strengthening of their relations. 4 8 Article 1 provides
that the parties shall abide by the provisions of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade that are not inconsistent with the Trade Agree-
ment. Reciprocity in reductions of trade barriers and a satisfactory
level of concessions are the principles established in Article 1. Article 2
commits the parties to the expansion of trade and cooperation in eco-
nomic matters, including relationships between "firms, enterprises and
companies of the two countries." Article 2(3) defines broadly the prac-
tices and law to be applied in commercial transactions. Article 3 goes
into greater detail on providing increased business facilities, recognizes
mutual rights of access to courts and administrative agencies, provides
in detail for representation of businesses within each country, and es-
tablishes the principles of (1) advertising access, (2) exchanges of in-
formation among businesses, (3) access of personnel, (4) assistance
with business problems by governments, and (5) the barring of unrea-
sonable government interference with contracts.4 9 Article IV estab-
lishes U.S. dollars as the commercial currency between the countries,
and commits the parties to "grant any authorization necessary" to fa-
cilitate financing of commercial transactions. Free movement of con-
vertible currencies out of each country is established in Article IV(5).
Article V incorporates provisions of the Paris Convention for the Pro-
tection of Industrial Property and the Universal Copyright Convention,
and national treatments are established as required and where they are
more favorable. Article VI commits the parties to encourage the estab-
lishment of commercial offices. Article VII is an escape clause for situ-
46. Convention on the Avoidance of Double Taxation and Income Tax, Feb. 12,
1979, United States - Hungary, 30 U.S.T. 6347, T.I.A.S. No. 9560.
47. Agreement on Tariff Matters, Nov. 18, 1978 - Sept. 18, 1980, United States -
Hungary, 32 U.S.T. 5371, T.I.A.S. No. 9992. Non-Tariff Matters, Tokyo Round of
Multi-Lateral Trade Negotiations, Aug. 3, 1978 - May 30, 1980, 32 U.S.T. 5357,
T.I.A.S. No. 5357. Concerning CMEA countries participation in the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade, see Patterson, Improving GATT Rules for Non-Market
Economies, 20 JOURNAL OF WORLD TRADE LAW 195 (1996).
48. Supra note 45, at 2712.
49. Concerning advertising law in Hungary, see How TO TRADE WITH HUN-
GARY, supra note I, at 15-19.
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ations where there is significant disruption of a domestic industry, and
provides for consultations detailed in the Agreement Annex.50 Article
VIII concerns encouragement of arbitration among commercial con-
tractors. Article IX establishes the right of either party "to take any
action for the protection of its security interests." Article X provides
some definitional specificity.
The Agreement's duration is for three years, automatically ex-
tended for successive three year periods unless there is termination
thirty days prior to expiration. The United States has retained the right
to abrogate should domestic legislative authority to carry out provisions
be lacking.
The Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the
prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income is quite
detailed.5 1 It categorizes certain individuals for taxation purposes and
provides the rates of taxation to which they will be subjected and the
resulting payments to each country. The principle of non-discrimination
in the application of taxes to citizens of each country is also provided.
These agreements raise questions as to the degree to which the
United States ought to do more to "encourage, promote and facilitate"
cooperation among firms, 2 "facilitate the exchange of goods and ser-
vices""3 and generally develop stronger trading ties with Hungary. The
basic principle of reciprocity is clearly within the contemplation of such
provisions, even if that principle is expressly established mainly with
respect to reducing tariffs and non-tariff trade barriers." These policy
questions must now be considered in terms of the expectations underly-
ing the Agreement and with particular reference to the rapid, signifi-
cant changes in Hungary and in the Soviet attitudes.
III. THE COUNCIL OF MUTUAL ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE AND THE
DEVELOPING STRUCTURE OF FOREIGN TRADE
The potential for change in the structure of trade among Eastern
European countries and the Soviet Union, which is now being actively
promoted by reformers in the region, is perhaps the most crucial issue
that could influence foreign participation in production of goods in
50. The Article is worded to expressly meet provisions of the United States Trade
Act of 1974 requiring safeguards regarding market disruption due to imports of goods
from communist countries.
51. Supra note 46.
52. Supra note 45, art. 2.
53. Id.
54. Supra note 45, art. I.
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Eastern European countries.55 International economic relationships be-
tween Eastern European countries and others are governed by agree-
ments within the CMEA, an organization developed following the Sec-
ond World War as a counterpart to the Warsaw Pact military
alliance." In effect, CMEA is a set of bilateral relationships that seek,
among other things, to develop the economic integration of its mem-
bers.57 It generally has been ineffective. Currencies are not convertible
and trade is conducted in rubles and Western currencies. The existence
of national monopolies is intended to achieve a certain degree of uni-
formity between CMEA members in order to promote integration, but
there is little of what is recognized in the West as specialization of
industries. 8 Special programs for further economic integration are
launched periodically, but they are devoid of practical consequences,
although the Soviet Union has continued to insist on joint venture
projects.59
In CMEA countries generally, Foreign Trade Organizations
("FTO's") have exclusive responsibility for conducting foreign trade.60
Each FTO normally has a monopoly in trade in particular areas of
goods." Hungary, however, is now distinguished among CMEA coun-
tries in that large domestic enterprises are eligible to be independently
55. Concerning economic development and East-West relations see M.I.
GOLDMAN, USSR IN CRISIS: THE FAILURE OF AN ECONOMIC SYSTEM, (1983); MARER
& MONTIAs, EAST EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND EAST WEST TRADE, (1980); EAST-
WEST TRADE AND FINANCE IN THE WORLD ECONOMY, (C. Saunders ed. 1985); FOR-
EIGN AND DOMESTIC POLICY IN EASTERN EUROPE IN THE 1980's, (Sodaro & Wolchik
eds. 1983); SOBELL, THE RED MARKET: INDUSTRIAL COOPERATION AND SPECIALIZA-
TION IN COMECON, (1984); Kitchen, A Bibliography on Transnational Litigation in
Socialist Countries: Discovery Evidence and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, 21
TEX. INT'L. L. J. 383 (1986); concerning Hungarian relations with the Soviet block
countries see C. Gati, HUNGARY AND THE SOVIET BLOCK (1986); Roosa, Matsukawa
& Gutowski, East-West Trade at a Crossroads: Economic Relations with the Soviet
Union and Eastern Europe, 24 THE TRIANGLE PAPERS, REPORT TO THE TRILATERAL
COMMISSION (1982). Concerning Soviet interest in trade with the Far East see
Perkovich, The Soviet Union Turns East, THE ATLANTIC, Dec. 1987, at 30. For a
discussion of CMEA firms operating outside the CMEA countries see C. MCMILLAN,
MULTINATIONALS FROM THE SECOND WORLD (1987).
56. See T. HOYA, supra note 21, at 9; East-West Financial Relations, supra note
3, at 19-21.
57. Kamm, Lean Times in Hungary, supra note 33. See also Kamm, In Hungary,
supra note 6.
58. See Kamm, Lean Times in Hungary, supra note 33.
59. See Volgyes, supra note 16.
60. Id.
61. Id.
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authorized and to engage in foreign trade along with the FTO's.21
Despite such changes, CMEA decision-making structure remains
elaborate and deeply rooted, and it has constrained systematic,
planned, coordinated trade among member nations. Prior to the
Gorbachev era, differing views developed regarding the problems of
CMEA trade, i.e., the "Hungarian" and the "Soviet" view, and actual
trade practices were fractious. 3 The Soviets favored the economic inte-
gration of the activities of state enterprises, whereas Hungary and
others would have liked to westernize trade relationships by establish-
ing convertible currencies and through further decentralization.64
With respect to FTO's specifically, disagreements still arise in in-
tra-CMEA trade concerning the degree to which FTO's are bound by
intergovernmental agreements. In fact, FTO's are increasingly less
bound by planned specifications and more inclined to seek an FTO con-
tract before international agreements. Annual protocol provide for such
contracts under the expectation that such contracts will be permitted
by future CMEA agreements. 6 Nevertheless, even in the traditional
sequence allowing for foreign trade - international agreement, annual
protocol, and FTO contract - matters not included in a general inter-
governmental agreement or in annual protocols are within the discre-
tion of contracting FTO's.6 6 It is noteworthy that pricing is not under-
taken in international agreements and thus is governed under the
discretionary authority of the FTO's.6 7 Where two FTO's contract in a
way that diverges from the long term agreement or the annual protocol,
increasingly their judgment has been sustained.6 8 Where FTO's fail to
agree on trade that is mandated in an intergovernmental agreement or
protocol, the matter must be addressed by foreign ministries. 9
62. Joint ventures also have this authority. Note also that the 1972 Hungarian
constitution did not indicate that FTO's must hold a monopoly, but FTO's traditionally
have been limited in number and serve as a state monopoly on foreign trade. See Madl,
supra note 1, at 136.
63. See WALLACE & CLARKE, COMECON, TRADE AND THE WEST, 155-157 (1986).
64. Id.
65. Id. Among Hungary, Poland, the German Democratic Republic and Czecho-
slovakia in particular, FTO contracts are increasingly concluded before corresponding
inter-governmental long term agreements and annual protocols.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 157.
68. Id.
69. Agreements between Western corporations and FTO's generally fit the stan-
dards of FTO's. See T. HOYA, supra note 21, at 19-22. In joint venture agreements
(recent Hungarian law has liberalized joint venture access to foreign trade rights) the
contracts are certainly more influenced by Western standards. HUNGARIAN CHAMBER
OF COMMERCE, supra note 15, at 9, 13, 53. Strict trade agreements between Western
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One of the key complaints of Western corporations involved in
joint ventures is the inability or unwillingness of Hungarian authorities
to assist in the development of export relationships with other CMEA
countries. In principle, the development of foreign trade rights for the
joint venture itself should help ease problems in developing trading re-
lationships; but the more significant change would be the creation of
joint venture enterprises across borders or in different countries. If such
a structural change becomes a reality in the future, not only might
considerable trade develop among organizations removed from the
reach of detailed planning specifications, but greater managerial con-
trol over the marketing of goods, services, and equipment also could
develop. This development is thought to be the key to expanded in-
volvement of large Western firms in the region. 0
Exchange rates in Hungary currently are set to encourage imports
from the Soviet Union and exports to hard currency areas, factors that
discourage joint ventures. The Hungarian government is aware the
problem needs to be addressed. Another hurdle to making joint ven-
tures operational and profitable is that exporting to CMEA countries,
being on a government to government basis, involves little opportunity
for promoting products. Even if such opportunities presented them-
selves, it may not be in Hungary's national interest to engage in promo-
tion. In effect, where the Hungarian government engages too strenu-
ously in promotion, it places itself at a disadvantage by encouraging
other CMEA governments to establish direct links to Western firms.7 1
Thus, the Western firm faces major obstacles to gaining access to other
CMEA markets through Hungary while the Western partner must also
grapple with a loss of control over marketing, pricing, sourcing, and
companies and FTO's continue to employ the CMEA standards, a product of bargain-
ing of companies with FTO's and not a product of agreements at the intergovernmental
levels. In this regard there are several areas that have been singled out, on the basis of
prior experience, as areas where Western governments should aid in the development of
trade contracts: substantive law third country designation, force majeure clauses (par-
ticularly regarding labor disputes) and price escalation clauses. See T. HOYA, supra
note 21, at 363-364; Naray, supra note 1, at 280-85; Burckhardt, supra note 20, at 11.
See also, Resolution of International Trade Disputes: An Analysis of the Soviet For-
eign Trade Arbitration Commission's Decisions Concerning the Doctrine of Force
Majeure as an Excuse to the Performance of Private International Trade Agreements,
10 MD. J. INT. L. AND TRADE, 135 (1986).
70. Review of Joint Ventures in Hungary, supra note 1, at 053179. The Hun-
garian Chamber of Commerce is careful to limit expectations about major expansion of
markets for Western companies in its joint venture policy statements, emphasizing
rather, the ability of Western corporations to realize more profit in Hungary and ex-
isting markets. See HUNGARIAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 15, at 10.
71. See Review of Joint Ventures, supra note 1, at 053179.
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distribution.72
The key aspect of the new Hungarian law on joint ventures is pre-
cisely that regulatory change in the domestic and foreign trading sys-
tem represents a gamble which could yield large returns perhaps only
on the condition that other CMEA countries follow suit.78 The Secre-
tary-General of the Institute of Economics at the Hungarian Academy
of Sciences has urged that CMEA "open [its] markets to each other;
and cooperative links should exist not through interstate but intercom-
pany specialization, so that a more up-to-date and cheaper product
would take the place of the more costly. . . .This would involve com-
petition in efficiency, to be encouraged by long term reforms.74
IV. THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF
FINANCIAL INVESTMENT AND THE RESTRUCTURING OF THE
HUNGARIAN BANKING SYSTEM
Since the debt problems of the late 1970's and early 1980's, Hun-
gary has sought and accomplished debt restructuring under a plan
fashioned in cooperation with the International Monetary Fund."
Eighty percent of combined foreign debt is now structured in medium
and long term debt with an average maturity of seven years.76 Since
Hungary joined the international lending institutions during the first
half of the 1980's, 77 its internal credit system and its financial practices
have been restructured to conform with those employed by the World
Bank group.7 8 Relationships such as these are crucial to the reorganiza-
72. Id. One solution proposed for dealing with the exchange rate problem is to
develop "trading houses" to serve as "umbrella organizations" for joint ventures.
"Their main mission would be the in-house conversion to dollars of the trade ruble
imports Hungary received in exchange for the joint venture's trade ruble export." Id.
73. Id. Concerning changes in the way in which Hungarian foreign trade is to be
conducted see Madl, supra, note 1, at 136.
74. See Kamm, In Hungary, supra note 6. Open criticism of Soviet CMEA policy
is a relatively new development in the region. See Lipsius, Capitalism in the Soviet's
Front Yard, 46 BuSINESS AND SOCIETY REVIEw, 57, 59 (1983).
75. Sajosi-Kovats, supra note 31.
76. Id.
77. Hungary has been a member of the World Bank since June, 1982, and joined
the two affiliated institutions of the World Bank, the International Finance Corporation
and the International Development Association in April, 1985.
78. Sajosi-Kovats, supra note 31, at 14-15. Hungary has participated in major
accounting adjustments in which standard measures of profitability, liquidity, and sol-
vency are used. Id. Hungary's attitude toward the international financial system stands
out among Eastern European countries. Id.
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tion of the financial underpinnings of Hungarian affairs. 9
Part of the process of reform and development of joint ventures,
perhaps the most significant part, is the general reform of the domestic
banking system. In 1982 several technical, specialized banks were es-
tablished.8" The banking system was revamped in 1987 into a two-tier
structure with five commercial banks made responsible for taking de-
posits and providing credit throughout Hungary. 81 New banking enti-
ties in addition to the two that existed previously - the National Bank
of Hungary and the Trade Bank - have been or will be established.
82
Coupled with the process of banking reform has been the legaliza-
tion of onshore foreign banking. Citibank has obtained onshore banking
rights. 83 Unicbank, with the participation of the International Finance
Corporation, began operations in 1987 specifically with an interest in
developing joint ventures: fifty-five percent of its capital is shared with
German (Deutsche Genossenshaftsbank) and Austrian (Genossenshaft-
sliche Zentral Bank) cooperative banks. 8' Another European bank, the
Central European Investment Bank applied for an onshore banking li-
cence in 1987.85 With partners in West Germany, France, Italy and
Japan, this bank represents significant potential for investments from a
variety of sources.
Continued access to financial markets on favorable terms appears
to be essential to Hungary's economic well-being. 6 The first principle
of investment negotiation has therefore become that of maintaining
flexibility and easing of obstacles for favored projects. Indeed, borrow-
ing rose from half a billion dollars in 1983 to one and one half billion
dollars in 1985 .8 Nevertheless, accumulated agricultural debt is an
ongoing drain upon resources, and price increases and wider application
79. For example, Hungary meets requirements for openness in financial informa-
tion and thereby eases participation in the international financial system.
80. See Review of Joint Ventures in Hungary, supra note 1, at 053177.
81. id.
82. Id.
83. Citibank Budapest has been in operation since late 1985. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. It is clear that the financial crisis of the late 1970's and early 1980's which
significantly reduced income expectations has reshuffled relative economic priorities so
that the maintenance of financial stability is always considered first. Targets for income
growth, the investment strategies to be pursued, the role of Western capital, technol-
ogy, and Western financial markets are all part of a comprehensive policy; reform of
economic institutions is approached within this framework. See HUNGARY: ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENTS AND REFORMS, supra note 1, at 1-7.
87. FOREIGN ECONOMIC TRENDS, supra note 1, at 5.
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of new bankruptcy laws are generally believed by Hungarian econo-
mists to be inadequate to address problems of insufficient resources and
national income.88 The development of a formal relationship with the
World Bank, however, led to the almost immediate selection of Hun-
gary in 1983 for pilot projects in partnership financing with private
financial institutions for both agricultural and industrial projects.89
These project loans were concluded in tandem with traditional develop-
ment financing provided by the World Bank.90
Private financial institutions, particularly in Japan and Western
Europe, have recently negotiated new credit issues on highly favorable
terms. Despite the modest economic performance of the 1980's and po-
litical conditions which have not been amenable for reform,9" Hungary
has demonstrated an ability to gain financial support on favorable
terms. In June, 1985, loans of approximately one-half billion dollars
were arranged under the World Bank's B-Loan Co-financed Program,
including a three hundred million Eurodollar loan that involved the
participation of Chemical Bank International Ltd.9 2 These projects are
geared toward the expansion of exports, including projects involving
livestock, chemicals, particularly pharmaceuticals, and a railroadY.
88. Id. See also Bognar, supra note 13, at 53-54.
89. World Bank, World Bank News Release (June 11, 1985); Biro, The Hun-
garian Economy 1984, 25 NEW HUNGARIAN QUARTERLY 55-60 (1985).
90. World Bank, supra note 89.
91. This is to say that with a deepening crisis, the attraction of further extensive
domestic reform is considerable, and it has been resisted until quite recently; see
Volgyes, Ungarn: Steht eine Krise Bevor? 1987 OSTEUROPA 329 (1987). Yet the
processes underway have a certain momentum of their own. Compare Lipsius, supra
note 74, at 61. See also Volgyes, supra note 16, at 374-75.
92. World Bank, supra note 89.
93. The World Bank funded portion of any co-financed loan must be employed
within the framework of World Bank contracting guidelines. The Bank component of
the June 1985 arrangements was about 10%. The commercial portion of the Eurodol-
lar loan was for eight years, at a rate of interest of 5% percent per year over the three or
six month London Interbank Offered Rate ("LIBOR").
In 1985, a 7%, 15 year Dm 150,000 bond issue was offered. More recently, Hun-
gary has been able to take advantage of surplus Japanese liquidity in a March, 1987,
syndication on Tokyo and European markets of a $150 million loan at 1/4 percent above
LIBOR. However, a May, 1987, $400 million Eurosyndicated loan was arranged at
3/s% over LIBOR with large fees attached. See Sajosi-Kovats, supra note 31, at 15.
See also FOREIGN ECONOMIC TRENDS, supra note 1, at 7-8. The partnership financing
program is called a "B loan" and may involve, though it has not involved in the Hun-
garian loans, guarantee of the loans provided by private investors where there is some
"additionality," provided by the private investor for the guarantee. World Bank, supra
note 89. Concerning co-financing in general, see THE WORLD BANK, CO-FINANCING
(1983); THE WORLD BANK, PROCUREMENT AND CO-FINANCING: METHODS AND PRO-
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The success of Hungarian financial officials in stabilizing debt and
obtaining new credit on highly favorable terms stands out among devel-
oping countries. In fact, Eastern Europe is the only region among de-
veloping countries that has been able to regain access to the interna-
tional financial markets following the 1981 crisis.94 Within Eastern
Europe, Hungary is the only country not to have lost access to syndi-
cated loans throughout the period.95 Nevertheless, Hungary remains
the most vulnerable in terms of relative debt burden.9 The Hungarian
National Bank has presented the Hungarian circumstances as unique,
seeking to distinguish Hungary from the region. These efforts have re-
sulted in the easing of rates for export-related credits for the last four
years.97
V. JOINT VENTURES
The first joint venture law in a Soviet-type economy was developed
in the Soviet Union in the 1920's under the New Economic Program
("NEP").9" When the NEP was discontinued, so was the development
of joint ventures, 99 although the Soviet Union has indicated an inten-
tion to re-establish them. 100 Yugoslavia developed a joint venture'law in
the late 1960's and Hungary in 1972.101 Wholly owned or majority
owned subsidiaries in such countries are highly unusual, and the condi-
tions which may attach to such enterprises are an open question.102
Though a large part of joint venture activity in Hungary is regu-
lated by statutory law, 10 3 the hard currency input of Western firms and
the policy of promoting joint ventures for the development of the Hun-
garian economy generates a degree of negotiating flexibility despite the
statutory context. Factors of particular importance that motivate Hun-
garian flexibility are the development of managerial skills, the possibil-
CEDURES, THE WORLD BANK (1986).
94. See East-West Financial Relations, supra note 3, at 44.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. See also Sajosi-Kovats, supra note 31, at 15-16.
98. See Lebkowski & Monkiewicz, Western Direct Investment in Centrally
Planned Economies, 20 J. WORLD TRADE L. 624 (1986).
99. Id.
100. See Buxbaum, supra note 11, at 67.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. The more regulated these relationships become, the more flexibility appears
to be institutionalized. See generally Review of Joint Ventures in Hungary, supra note
1; Naray, supra note 1, at 283.
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ity of technology transfer, and opportunities for countertrade. 1'0 Many
practical difficulties have been eased by such an approach while others,
including problems of the most basic sort such as telephone links, are
being addressed. Problems are accordingly influenced by an active gov-
ernmental effort to promote and assist joint ventures, including the area
of capitalization. 10
5
Joint ventures, which have been on a small scale in the past, have
enjoyed an impressive success rate.1"6 The Hungarian Chamber of
Commerce describes government support for the new joint venture pol-
icy as follows:
The Hungarian Government supports the formation of joint ven-
tures as being in accordance with its long term economic strategies.
The activities of such associations - whether producing, commer-
cial or servicing - are considered useful if they aim at the develop-
ment of the technical or economic level, if they promote the intro-
duction of advanced techniques, technologies and organizational
methods; if they enlarge the market system, increase exports or
contribute to obtaining some other advantage in the foreign ex-
change balance. 107
Joint ventures can occur in five forms: (1) unlimited partnerships;
(2) public limited companies; (3) limited liability companies; (4) joint
enterprises; and (5) limited partnerships. 0 The Hungarian partner
may be an Hungarian state enterprise, a trust, other state-owned eco-
nomic associations, a cooperative, a cooperative enterprise, an economic
association of a cooperative enterprise, an affiliate company, and cer-
tain other enterprises maintained by legal entities as well as water
management societies.10 9 Except for the National Bank of Hungary
and banking institutes active with foreign participation, Hungarian
banks may enter into joint ventures arrangements." 0
104. HUNGARIAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 15, at 7-11.
105. The availability of state funds for joint ventures eases the problem of the
Hungarian partner's lack of assets; see id. at 9.
106. See generally Review of Joint Ventures in Hungary, supra note 1. Note also,
however, that only about a dozen of the ventures operating in Hungary in 1985 in-
volved manufacturing, and many believe that without the development of the capacity
to penetrate the Soviet market and use Hungary as a base for such operations, large
scale investment may not develop.
107. Id. at 8-9.
108. HUNGARIAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 15, at 19-21.
109. Id. at 13.
110. Id. at 14.
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Among the key questions regarding the regulation of investment
and economic reform involving joint ventures are the following: (1) the
potential effect of subsequent legislation on contractual joint ventures
undertaken within the scope of the joint venture law;111 (2) the legal
powers of joint ventures, especially regarding foreign trade; 2 (3) the
division of' responsibility and the issue of control; and (4) the equity
relationships involved in them.113
Two particularly thorny issues involved with the practicality of
joint venture are the issues of valuation' 14 and taxation." 5 Certainly
one of the most difficult problems faced by joint ventures is the valua-
tion question. Calculation of the value of land, buildings, and labor"'
must address the question of whether it should be priced using the local
or international measures, but it is perhaps the most important factor
in the assessment of potential returns facing the foreign partner. 1 7 Val-
uing the inputs of the foreign partner presents the same problem as
does the pricing of such overhead costs.
111. Id. at 9-10. Note that the security of investment is addressed in current law.
112. Concerning the development of the law of joint ventures, see Scriven, Joint
Venture Legislation in Eastern Europe: A Practical Guide, 21 HARVARD INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW JOURNAL 633 (1980); Lebkowski & Monkiewicz, supra note 98; Bux-
baum, supra note 11; Buzescu, Joint Ventures in Eastern Europe, 32 AM.J. COMP.
LAW 407 (1984); Schmidt, supra note 21. Concerning the development of joint ven-
tures in the People's Republic of China, see Saney, Fisburne & Chandri, Joint Ven-
tures in China, the First Water Stop, 21 TEX. J. INT. L. 221 (1986).
113. Concerning negotiation of the joint venture contract, see Buzescu, supra note
112, at 407-413 and 421-429. Note that five corporate forms for joint ventures have
been put into practice, whether under the rubric of revived pre-World War Two stat-
utes or through the creation of new corporate forms, i.e., the limited partnership. HUN-
GARIAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 15, at 15-22.
114. Buzescu, supra note 112, at 421-425, and Buxbaum, supra note 11, at 69-77.
115. Concerning taxation see Nagy, Introduction to Tax Systems in Comecon
Countries, 10 INT. Bus. LAW. 56 (1982); Doman, supra note'20; P. JONAS, TAXATION
OF MULTINATIONALS IN COMMUNIST COUNTRIES (1978). Special rules, including ex-
ceptions from many Hungarian laws, including fixed wages, have been established for
ventures in customs free zones, established beginning in 1982. HUNGARIAN CHAMBER
OF COMMERCE, supra note 15, at 21-22.
116. Hungary advertises the higher training of its workers in comparison to work-
ers of the same relative wage level in other countries. In effect, Hungary advertises the
opportunity for higher productivity by using Hungarian workers. The wages of skilled
workers in Hungary are estimated to be at about the same level as wages of workers in
Taiwan and Brazil and countries of similar levels of development. See Review of Joint
Ventures in Hungary, supra note 1, at 053179; HUNGARY: ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS
AND REFORMS, supra note 1, 8-12. Social insurance contributions to the state are
mandatory. See Buxbaum, supra note 11, at 70-72.
117. See Buxbaum, supra note 11, at 70-72. Note that equity ownership is gener-
ally limited to 49% of the venture.
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Recent law establishes preferential treatment for joint ventures in
matters of taxation, foreign trade rights, and access to capital. 118 It
should be noted that both Hungarian and foreign participants are
treated preferentially in the context of the joint venture." 9 In particu-
lar, a larger share of revenues is available to the Hungarian partner
than would be the case in a purely Hungarian endeavor. 2 ' The Hun-
garian founder may obtain state funds for joint ventures and receive
credits on favorable terms.' 2 ' Further, the Hungarian partner is taxed
at the same overall, preferential rate as is the foreign participant. Thus,
the impact of foreign participation is to expand control over revenues
by the Hungarian partner. Despite foreign ownership, the enterprise is
treated as a single entity legally and practically.
The new Hungarian law also creates more certainty and ease in
the process by which joint ventures can be established.' 22 Licensing is
now carried out in one step. 123 A permit for preliminary negotiations is
no longer required, merely a notification of intention. 24 The general
provisions for granting foreign trade rights have been simplified and
liberalized, and the joint venture is in a better position now to obtain a
license to export its products. 25 The liberalization applies to both ex-
ports and imports in non-rouble currencies.' 26
The minister of finance supervises the legality of the operation of
joint ventures. 27 Questions of repatriation and investment security are
described by the Hungarian Chamber of Commerce as following:
118. HUNGARIAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 15, at 9.
119. Id. On recent liberalization of foreign trade rights see Naray, supra note 1,
at 283.
120. HUNGARIAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 15, at 9.
121. Id.
122. One of the most significant factors in the change of environment in Hungary
is clearly the delegation of responsibility to the Hungarian Chamber of Commerce to
assist in the development of joint ventures. Other agencies have been created as well,
but the Chamber of Commerce is the most active in the development, promotion, and
coordination of joint ventures. The Chamber of Commerce represents the management
of industrial (state) companies. See Review of Joint Ventures in Hungary, supra note
1, at 053177. Compare How To TRADE WITH HUNGARY, supra note 1, at 60-63
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. See also Naray, supra note 1, at 283. This appears to be a critical devel-
opment not only for joint ventures, but the liberalization of general laws has also al-
lowed even purely Hungarian ventures to circumvent the Foreign Trade Organizations.
The liberalization applies, moreover, to both exports and imports in non-ruble
currencies.
126. Review of Joint Ventures in Hungary, supra note 1.
127. Id.
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The foreign partners' profit and other remunerations can be trans-
ferred abroad in the currency defined in the articles of the Deed of
Association. On request, the National Bank of Hungary will issue a
guaranty to that effect. Similarly, the Bank will guarantee the com-
pensation of any loss of the foreign partner's material contribution
caused by a state (government) measure. If the foreign party leaves
the association, the relevant share of assets will be transferred
abroad in the currency defined in the articles of the Deed of Associ-
ation, as when the association is wound up the property share re-
maining after the acquittal of debts will be transferred abroad free
of tax.' 28
For ventures operating in a preferred area, the tax system is now
simplified and restructured by statute." 9 After deduction of social in-
surance contributions, the general tax rate is forty percent. It is un-
usual, however, for a joint venture to pay this tax, and if the joint ven-
ture is taxed at that rate, other benefits can still be negotiated.130 The
Minister of Finance has the power to grant tax benefits more favorable
than the legislative prescriptions for certain categories and levels of in-
vestment."' For example, if the total capital of the venture amounts to
at least twenty-five million forints and the foreign share is at least
thirty percent, producing companies are taxed at a rate of twenty per-
cent in the first five years, and subsequently at a rate of thirty per-
cent.132 Reinvestment of fifty percent of the profit, if greater than five
million forints, yields a fifty percent reimbursement of paid taxes, and
a 100 percent reinvestment, if greater than ten million forints, yields a
seventy-five percent reduction.'
Since 1982 economic associations have been permitted to be estab-
lished in customs free zones.' The Ministries of Foreign and Domestic
Trade and the Ministry of Transport share consultative authority re-
128. Id. at 10. See also Review of Joint Ventures in Hungary, supra note 1, at
053177.
129. See Review of Joint Ventures in Hungary, supra note 1, at 053177. Concern-
ing U.S. tax treatment of various kinds of enterprises operating abroad, see Sitt, Char-
acterization of Foreign Business Entities for Tax Purposes: The Chaos Continues,
8 HOUSTON J. INT. L. 201 (1986). Concerning the basic approach to taxation of for-
eigners, see Nagy, The Hungarian Tax System as Applicable to Non-residents, 10
INT. Bus. LAWYER 83 (1982).
130. Review of Joint Ventures in Hungary, supra note 1.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. See HUNGARIAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 15, at 11-12.
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garding zone designation with the formal designator, the National
Command of the Customs and Excise guard.'38 In general, the rules for
foreign- trading in such zones are quite liberal, whereas the rules for
trading within Hungary are much stricter. Purchases and sales of both
imports and exports are regarded as free-currency transactions." 6 The
associations are exempt from rules on enterprise-income, wages, state
and internal control, the management of finances, and the purchase
and use of automobiles.' Capital stock, however, must be kept in a
Hungarian bank and a risk fund must be established. 138 All other Hun-
garian laws apply.
Despite these changes, there are only eighty joint ventures in Hun-
gary today, twenty-five more than in 1985, but hundreds of cooperation
and licensing agreements with Western firms.'3 9 Hungary's current five
year plan (1986-1990), however, forecasts a $200 million flow in joint
venture capital." 0 Recently concluded agreements include McDonald's
and ITT, via ITT's West German subsidiary. 4' In addition, formal in-
vestment agreements have been completed with West European coun-
tries. 42 Still, it must be noted that the lack of natural resources, the
rigid marketing structures among CMEA countries, and exchange rate
problems among these countries all hamper the development of large
joint ventures. 41
Indeed, difficulties in undertaking any joint venture in Hungary,
large or small, remain considerable even with the changes. Investment
policies in the newly industrialized countries ("NIC's") are generally
more favorable than in Hungary,"' but the recent commitment of the
Hungarian government has been effective. The recent presence of es-
tablished multinational firms is evidence of increasing interest. The ar-
eas these firms are seeking to develop include advanced technologies
such as biotechnology and telecommunications as well as the vehicle
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 053176. The lack of joint ventures and the proliferation of licensing
agreements is obviously attributable to the government's past attitude toward such
activities.
140. Id.
141. Id. See also McDonald's in Hungary: Joint Venture Instead of Franchise,
Bus. E. EUR., Dec. 22, 1986, at 403.
142. See generally Review of Joint Ventures in Hungary, supra note 1.
143. See East-West Financial Relations, supra note 3, at 19-23, 43-46.
144. Id.
1988]
300 MD. JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW & TRADE [Vol. 12
industry. 145 The Hungarian government's key priority is to develop the
country's economic and technological infrastructure, particularly in
management and consulting areas. 4" But the keys to successful devel-
opment of a large base of foreign investment are considered to be (1)
access to the CMEA market and (2) the development of component
production and competitively priced products for international markets
of multi-national firms. 147
The joint venture represents, in part, a mechanism for achieving
the benefits of trade relationships that cannot now be funded without
engendering insurmountable hard currency costs. Furthermore, joint
ventures allow for the introduction of financial capital without under-
taking more radical measures of reform or risking the tensions that
could result from independent foreign ventures, i.e., wholly owned sub-
sidiaries within Hungary. In any event, joint ventures must be still
viewed as an adventure for both parties. The U.S. Embassy in Hungary
views the opportunity for Western business partners in this way:
A joint venture in Hungary gives western partners valuable experi-
ence in the most flexible and favorable investment climate in east-
ern Europe. . . . Joint ventures are marriages of companies and
like the personal kind may respond to certain stimuli that can defy
reason and have a lot to do with the climate at a given mo-
ment. . . . Given this analogy the current climate for joint ven-
tures in Hungary is relatively favorable, particularly when com-
pared with other eastern European countries. The result is a
growing number of joint western ventures and officially expressed
hope that the trend will continue. . . . The growing interest in
joint ventures elsewhere in eastern Europe, particularly in the So-
viet Union, is also a stimulant that favors Hungary.
4 8
VI. THE REFORM OF ECONOMIC ORGANIZATIONS AND POLITICAL
REFORM
One of the key concerns for Western companies seeking to invest
in Hungary and other CMEA countries is the matter of political uncer-
tainty. Presumably, significantly larger investments, combined with a
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. See the review of a recent Paul Marer's Budapest lecture in Review of Joint
Ventures in Hungary, supra note 1, at 053178.
148. See id. at 053176.
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"re-arrangement of competencies," could speed reform, or ultimately
slow it, if retrenchment of established interests results. In either case,
domestic unease is a certainty but its ultimate affect is not clear.1'9
The policy makers in Hungary have been divided between two
viewpoints: (1) the inability of reforms initiated since the mid-seventies
to spark stronger growth is thought by some observers to be due to the
general stagnation in the international economy and, in particular, to
protectionist forces; and (2) international slowdown and resource
shortages are considered by others to be but one factor contributing to
poor economic growth with the more significant factor being the insuffi-
ciency of reform. 50 Those subscribing to the latter view hold that the
potential of existing reforms has been exhausted and relics of past
practice act as a restraint upon economic initiative and institutional
creativity."" They argue that the limits of the current mechanisms are
becoming increasingly evident, particularly in terms of the morale of
the population.' 52
One diplomat in Budapest has described the newest development
of political and economic ideas as "pressing against the ideological bars
of the cage."' 1 3 Yet, whatever expressions of liberal attitudes by Hun-
garian leaders exist, these cannot be accepted either at face value or
discounted as purely rhetorical. The one party ideology is a phenome-
non of some solidity. But the "re-arrangement of competencies," the
drain of the best intellectuals and scientists, and other factors have
generated a considerable momentum for some form of political liberali-
zation. 54 A policy of retrenchment, turning back the process of reform
is not on the horizon, but could again emerge as it did in the early
1970's.
149. Insofar as the expectations raised by the reforms that began have not been
met, a marked increase in investment could help meet them to some extent, but in
either case, given the experience of the 1980's, and the pending succession and genera-
tional changes, the political outcomes are uncertain, and made more uncertain by pos-
sible changes in Soviet attitudes that East Europeans may find value in probing. See
Volgyes, supra note 16, at 375. See also Kamm, Lean Times in Hungary, supra note
33.
150. Volgyes, supra note 16.
151. See Kamm, Lean Times in Hungary, supra note 33.
152. Id. Note that workers have distributed handbills-following the destruction
by fire of three factories-warning against the raising of prices. Volgyes, supra note 16,
at 376.
153. See Kamm, Lean Times in Hungary, supra note 33.
154. The focus on the basic material problems of the Hungarian economy is a
fixation, even where the disintegration of the state and party is recognized. Volgyes,
supra note 16, at 375.
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The reform of Hungarian investment law, strengthening the
linkage of the Hungarian economy to the international economy, has
itself developed considerable momentum. While this momentum is sus-
tained and affirmed by rapid policy shifts in Moscow, the development
of reliance on the institutions built within the new framework could
strengthen that momentum even further. Within and without Hun-
garian society, reliance on the belief that there will be no reversal of
the institutional changes and the new international financial relation-
ships is crucial to furthering the legitimacy of the Hungarian regime.
In effect, the furtherance and deepening of reform has been geared to-
ward creating confidence in its permanence.15 5
Certainly economic reform can be viewed as a partial substitute
for overt political change. If, however, the institutions upon which the
regime relies for its claims to legitimacy and acceptance are dependant
upon market mechanisms, then variance in economic performance
could impact even more directly on the position of leadership than
would be the case otherwise.156 Reform in Hungary typically involves
changes in party leadership, not with the basic features of the party-
state system; but today both current economic and political models are
widely viewed as being obsolete. 15 7 It is clear that the current govern-
ment is insecure about retaining the status quo, but it is equally inse-
cure about further reform. 58 Reformers in Hungary recognize that ec-
onomic institutional developments are coming to dwarf the
development of the polity itself, and at a certain point could overwhelmit.159
Political reform must be understood and viewed against the back-
drop of prior domestic unrest in Hungary, including the 1956 revolu-
155. Mr. Volgyes writes:
At present, a restructuring program that goes beyond current policies does not
appear to be politically feasible. The reformers seem to suffer from a double politi-
cal handicap .... [Tihey are blamed by many of those whose standards of living
have dropped significantly during the last decade. Many Hungarians view the re-
formers as haughty beneficiaries of the changes who have. . .become 'dizzy with
their failures .... On the other hand the reformers are unable to find a respected
and able leader ....
Id. at 376.
156. Id.
157. See Kamm, Lean Times in Hungary, supra note 33; Comisso & Marer,
supra note 2, at 449-454.
158. Comisso & Marer, supra note 2, at 449-454.
159. Id. Said one Hungarian central banker: "The party is becoming a clearing
house of interests and ideas." The head of the Chamber of Commerce reports that the
new managerial class is not first initiated in the party, but rather is its darling. See
Lipsius, supra note 74, at 61.
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tion, and particularly with regard to the trade union movement which
emerged in Poland at the end of the last decade. 6 0 Worker unease
characterized the economic crisis of the late 1970's and early 1980's
and the accompanying measures of austerity. 6' There appear to be no
truly independent mechanisms for channeling worker disaffection.' 62
The current worry is not about activism of workers for more radical
democratic reform, however, but about opposition by workers to re-
forms which increase the cost of living and create unemployment. 63
The new autonomous institutions could provide redress for such
tensions arising from divergences in income and status. In particular,
the exercise of autonomy, e.g., in the selection of managers, could
channel the disaffection away from affecting political power. Thus, the
new institutions may act to preserve the status quo. But such decentral-
ization of decision-making also gives rise to new power bases, particu-
larly local ones.1 64 Such a development would represent a significant
political shift. While such potential fragmentation in control could be
offset by the development of broad independent national organizations
such as trade unions and multiple political parties, neither of these in-
stitutional forms currently seem realizable.165
160. The Solidarity experience in Poland has not been warmly received among
Hungarians; however, when Lech Walesa was interviewed on Hungarian television he
was closely interrogated concerning economic functions of the Solidarity organization.
Lipsius, supra note 74, at 60.
161. Volgyes, supra note 16, at 376.
162. It is thought that as many as 200,000 Hungarians could be effected by an
unflinching application of bankruptcy laws. Kamm, Lean Times in Hungary, supra
note 33. Concerning the need or not for independent mechanisms, it should be noted
that shop steward's organizations have the power in Hungary to call a strike against a
particular company for reasons regarding working conditions. See Lipsius, supra note
74, at 61. Concerning labor law in Hungary, see Gayer, Some Questions on Labor Law
in Connection with Joint Ventures in Hungary, 10 INT. Bus. LAWYER 133-137 (1982);
Nagy, Labor Rules in Connection with the Economic Activity Performed by a For-
eigner, 10 INT. Bus. LAWYER
129 (1982).
163. See Volgyes, supra, note 16, at 376.
164. Note also that institutions such as FTO's, the Chamber of Commerce, joint
ventures, domestic enterprises and associations have been articulated juridically with
relatively little reference to a formal institution of private property. It is interesting to
speculate on the effect they might have in this regard.
165. Concerning the development of local power centers, see Comisso & Marer,
supra note 2, at 449-454. One conclusion is that if the regime is perceived to be moving
in steps toward effective political reforms, and follows suit, and if the nation is making
economic progress, the risk of a sharp retrenchment over the next decade, sufficient to
effect trade relationships or lead to a reversal of economic reform attitudes and prac-
tices, will remain exceedingly minimal. Another is that since the protracted economic
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VII. CONCLUSION
Hungarian policy makers consider one of their most critical
problems to be the protectionist trade measures imposed by Western
countries. 166 Hungary's economy is trade dependent, and any rise of
protectionism in the Western economies threatens to severely weaken
the financial basis for reform and growth and enhance income depen-
dency on CMEA trade. Moreover, protectionism could generate mo-
mentum in CMEA trade relationships which could act as a break upon
international economic integration.
Resolution of the problems in the international economy - cur-
rency stability, distribution of surpluses, and expansion of trade - will
certainly affect the pace and character of development and reform in
Hungary. The other major development that must impact strongly
upon Hungary is the scope and character of change in the Soviet Union
and the development of more decentralized economic systems in
CMEA countries. Efforts to achieve convertibility of the forint and in-
creased export production financing also would have a significant
impact.
A further factor for U.S. concern focuses on technology transfer.
Western policy makers that wish to encourage Hungarian economic de-
velopment and reform must allow for the export of more sophisticated
technologies. Accordingly, a classification system that serves the needs
of both countries should be developed.
A third factor is that Hungary has situated itself, perhaps more
than any than other East European countries, to benefit from improve-
ment in the economic strength of the major Western countries. If re-
form and increased trade are to be a priority, the U.S. and other West-
ern countries must choose to take actions in areas such as currency
convertibility and financing that make it easier for Hungary to benefit
from successful Western efforts to redress problems in the international
economy.
Finally, if personal economic rights are one element contributing
to the development of democratic political systems, fostering their de-
velopment in Hungary must certainly be a goal of Western policy mak-
crisis is showing overt signs of leading to an escalating unravelling of the polity and
that since the regime will be unlikely to be able to make the reforms necessary, the
situation will lead, presumptively, to inevitable retrenchment. But cf. Volgyes, supra
note 16, at 376. For an excellent discussion of political difficulties associated with inter-
national adjustments, see Ikenberry, The State and Strategies of International Adjust-
ment, 39 WORLD POLITICS, 53 (1986).
166. Volgyes, supra note 16.
1988] HUNGARIAN INVESTMENT 305
ers. Hungary, however, appears to be seeking to develop Western inter-
ests that will be tied to its stability as a nation. Whether the U.S.
should foster those interests by encouraging public and private support
is a question that has to weighed against the uncertain consequences of
deepening economic crisis.
Christopher Raffaele

